In a presentation to national parliamentarians in the European Parliament, Struan Stevenson (ECR/UK) outlined his position on the reform of the Common Market Organisation (CMO), for which he is the Fisheries Committee rapporteur. Stevenson stated that his report will feature suggestions on how to reform the role of POs in fisheries management, comments on the proposed storage mechanism, as well as amendments on the consumer information provided on fish products.
Currently there are 214 POs who are responsible for coordinating their members’ activities so that fish is supplied to the market when there is demand. Moreover, POs aim to concentrate the supply chain by grouping produce from individual fishermen – thus attempting to ensure that they achieve a better price at first sale and preventing supermarkets and large suppliers from driving down prices.
The main thrust of Stevenson’s proposals are to concentrate and beef up the existing networks of producer organisations, active in the EU. This would be done through forced mergers under rules which require POs to have a minimum number of members. Moreover, POs would need to become internationalised in order to facilitate cross-border quota pooling.
Stevenson was particularly critical of the Commission proposals for the new storage mechanism and trigger price. As the proposals currently stand, POs may provide and finance storage of fishery products that have been put up for sale but for which there was no buyer at the agreed trigger price. The trigger price has to be set before the beginning of each year, is limited to 80% of the weighted average price for the product in the past three years, and is subject to the Member State’s approval.
The storage mechanism enables producers to take products off the market and store them for sale at a later date. It is supported by substantial funding provided under the proposed future European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) (COM(2011)804), setting aside 45 million EUR from 2014 to 2018 (Art. 72), including a gradual phase out of aid before 2019. It is what remains of a raft of market interventions currently provided, including a price support system.
Stevenson argues that the central role of POs is to plan their members’ activities, and interventions through the storage mechanism would undermine this. By enabling fishers to obtain 80% of the value of their catch, regardless of whether there is a market for the produce or not, would for Stevenson distort the market. He argues that “abolishing the minimum price intervention mechanism will incentivise POs to ensure better market practices.”
Stevenson also had a controversial suggestion for reforming consumer labelling. He proposes that all current “eco-labels” could be scrapped and replaced by a voluntary EU label to which minimum standards would be applied, thereby creating a level playing field across the continent. However, this proposal would undermine the work done by several labels on ensuring their supply of sustainable produce, such as KRAV in Sweden, which have built up trust with consumers over a long period of time.