At a meeting in which Danish and Norwegian experiences of ITQ systems were presented, the consensus from four MEPs was that such a system of quota allocation should not be mandatory but may be a useful tool to reduce capacity if stringent safeguards are implemented.
Ole Christensen, a Danish social democrat MEP who is a substitute on the Fisheries Committee (PECH), organised the hearing as part of a series of meetings focusing on specific parts of the CFP reform as part of his work with the Fish For the Future (FFF) group.
The FFF group are a cross-party coalition of MEPs committed to reforming the Common Fisheries Policy. This group may have an important role to play in coordinating and informing MEPs from all parties now that the European Parliament has co-decision powers on fisheries legislation as a result of the Lisbon Treaty.
Ulrike Rodust, a German social democrat MEP who is the rapporteur for the CFP basic regulation, began her presentation by linking TFCs to overcapacity. She argued that the current overcapacity in the EU fleet leads to three significant problems; underused vessels having the potential to engage in illegal fishing, control and monitoring of fishing activities are more difficult, and that overcapacity puts pressure on the Council to increase TACs.
Rodust felt that TFCs would help fishermen to better plan their work and quota would concentrate in the hands of successful fishing companies. Moreover, those who wish to leave the industry would receive a payout by selling out their share of fishing concessions. She argues that an increased sense of responsibility would emerge in fishermen as the status of fish stocks would have a direct economic impact on them.
However, several of the presumptions Rodust made during her presentation were challenged by Thomas Højrup of the University of Copenhagen in his analysis of the consequences of the Danish ITQ system. His research has shown that TFCs do not contribute to a decrease in illegal fishing, rather highgrading becomes more prevalent as fishers attempt to maximise the value of their limited catch. This has also been borne out in the privatised Pacific halibut fishery.
Moreover, the claim that having fishing rights concentrated in the hands of fewer vessels will reduce the pressure on Ministers to increase TACs at Council meetings fails to hold up to scrutiny. Højrup explained that most quota transactions in Denmark have been funded by bank loans, with existing quota being used as security against the loans. A hypothetical situation in which interest rates were to rise sharply would mean that unless TACs were raised by Ministers, fishermen could go bankrupt, thus creating significant pressure on the Council to ignore scientific recommendations.
Isabella Lövin, a Green MEP from Sweden, posited that access criteria would be a superior method of quota allocation to TFCs, in terms of reducing capacity while redirecting incentives in the European fleet toward those vessels that are most sustainable. However, were TFCs to be utilised then obligations should be attached to these concessions so that Member States can direct their fleet toward long-term objectives of stock recovery. As a warning of what may happen were the EU to embrace the TFC system, the experience of Iceland whose Parliament has rejected their existing ITQ system and has now implemented a buyback scheme to restore quota ownership from their banking sector back to the State was raised.